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Abstract 
Multi-level governance is seen by different commentators as addressing a varied array of 
concerns. Some see it as a means of fulfilling the norms of the new public management, and 
thereby of freeing the administration of government programs from the constraints imposed by 
centralized bureaucracy. Some assess it in terms of dealing with policy problems so complex that 
they can only be addressed by concerted and co-ordinated efforts of more than one level of 
government and, often, a variety of agencies. At the same time, multi-level governance is also 
associated with the attempt to introduce a greater degree of flexibility into federal policy-making, 
in order to ensure that federal policies respect the unique characteristics of different 
communities. In this study, we bring all of these concerns to bear on three case studies of the 
multi-level governance of federal properties in Winnipeg, the James A. Richardson International 
Airport, the Kapyong Barracks and The Forks. The three properties are all administered by 
agencies at least one step removed from direct government supervision. We posed two research 
questions: 1) Are the operations of these agencies, and the character of their relations with 
federal and municipal governments, appropriate to the ends they are meant to serve? 2) Do they 
respect community difference? In all three cases, we find that the objective of effective 





 There is widespread agreement that multi-level governance represents an 
emerging political reality, but the rationale for it is explained in noticeably different ways by 
different commentators.  
 Multi-level governance is distinct from the traditional intergovernmental 
relations in that the latter is largely restricted to the study of federal-provincial relations, while the 
former treats cities, and sometimes communities, as visible and significant partners in the 
interplay among levels of government, and not simply as creatures of provincial government. The 
emergence of these changes in the way the federal system is studied is seen as being related to the 
enhanced economic and political importance of cities in a world marked by greatly increased 
freedom of movement for goods, people, ideas and money. In a world marked by free movement, 
cities become magnets for wealth and production on one hand and problems on the other. In the 
process their political importance is magnified. (Young and Leuprecht, 2006; Castells, 1996,pp. 
395-410) 
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Why multi-level governance? 
 That is a very brief encapsulation of points on which there is widespread 
agreement, but specifically, what are the intentions of governments as they develop increasingly 
complex interrelationships among all three of their levels, interrelationships that sometimes 
include direct participation of local communities and community groups, as well as various 
organizations and agencies not directly controlled by government departments? In answer to that 
question, there are various explanations, each of which highlights a different aspect of the 
complex changes underway.  
 One explanation interprets changed relations among levels of government as a 
series of attempts to conform to the norms of the new public management, whereby governments 
are advised that they should “steer”, but not necessarily “row”. (Garcea and Pontikes, 2006) In 
that interpretation, the federal and provincial governments are seen as recruiting local 
governments, and other agencies and organizations operating at the local level, as partners in 
governance, partners that will do a better job because they are not part of a vast, centralized 
bureaucracy.  
 A second answer to the question focuses on the nature of problems that confront 
policy-makers. In that emphasis, complex systems of intergovernmental co-operation are needed 
in order to deal with “wicked problems and complex files”. Bradford (2005) cites the example of 
concentrated poverty in urban neighbourhoods, facing “a mix of difficulties ranging from labour 
market weaknesses and racial, gender or other discrimination to limited social contacts and a 
fraying community infrastructure of housing, education, health, transit…” In such a situation, a 
federal labour market program, for example, may fail if “provinces do not ensure an adequate 
supply of child care, or municipalities do not arrange transit…” (Bradford, 2005, p. 4) 
 A third rationale for multi-level governance is evident in Bradford’s account, and 
cited in passing in that of Garcea and Pontikes. Bradford invokes the importance of “seeing like a 
community”, citing James C. Scott’s Seeing like a state (Scott, 1998; Bradford, p 5), an insightful 
dissection of how large-scale, centralized government projects fail through ignorance of local 
conditions and circumstances. For their part, Garcea and Pontikes note that one of the reasons 
provincial governments engage in multi-level initiatives is that they enhance “flexibility and 
sensitivity in meeting local conditions, needs and preferences” (Garcea and Pontikes, p. 338). 
 In other words, both accounts cite the importance of tailoring policy to the 
particularities of different communities. That rationale has been in the literature at least since the 
1990s, when European Union studies invoked the concept of subsidiarity, which was described as 
the principle that a decision be made or activity performed at the lowest level of government 
possible (Norton, 1994, pp. 28-31). It is that rationale that one of the authors of this study has 
placed at the centre of his studies of multi-level governance. In that interpretation, an important 
test of the efficacy of multi-level governance is whether it produces respect for community 
difference in national policy. (Author, 2006; Author, 2006) 
 This paper is a study of such multi-level governance, one piece of a much larger 
venture, a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada Major Collaborative 
Research Initiative (MCRI) on multi-level governance and public policy in Canadian 
municipalities. Our purpose is to look at how the federal and local governments in Winnipeg 
interact in the formulation and implementation of policy regarding federal property. We do this 
by means of three case studies of how three important tracts of federal land in Winnipeg are 
administered. The three are the former Canadian Forces Base Winnipeg, known as Kapyong 
Barracks; the Winnipeg International Airport (recently renamed the James A. Richardson 
International Airport), and a public recreation space in the heart of the city, called The Forks 
because of its location at the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine rivers.  
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 These case studies offer a rare glimpse into the seriously under-researched 
subject of federal-local relations, and they also offer an opportunity to examine some major issues 
of 21st century governance. In researching the operations of these three agencies, we sought 
answers to two questions central to judging the efficacy of a particular instance of multi-level 
governance: 
 
• Are the operations of these agencies, and the character of their relations with federal and 
municipal governments, appropriate to the ends they are meant to serve? 
• Do they respond appropriately to community difference? 
  
The first question covers such considerations as the policy’s effectiveness, efficiency, 
equity and optimality. It encompasses Bradford’s point that a policy process must be equal to the 
complexity of the problem being addressed as well as Garcea’s and Pontikes’s concern with an 
appropriate determination as to whether a government should “steer” or “row”, that is whether the 
policy in question requires the direct intervention of a federal government department, or whether 
it can be managed as well or better by a different agency or another level of government.  
 The second question considers whether each of these initiatives in multi-level 
governance does its job in a manner appropriate to Winnipeg. The Kapyong Barracks land is on 
the verge of being redeveloped into a new neighbourhood on a large piece of real estate in a 
prime location. The question of how this area is developed has important land use planning 
implications for the entire city, and is important, as we learned in the course of our study, to at 
least three different community groups that have direct stakes in its development. The airport is 
located a short distance from the centre of the city, and its operation has crucial economic and 
environmental implications for the city as a whole, as well as obvious neighbourhood effects. The 
Forks is a highly valued public facility in a central location, and any development there invariably 
excites public interest, and often controversy. In all three cases, therefore, the question of whether 
the administration of federal land respects a variety of community particularities is critical.  
 
Research methods 
 The research for this paper was done using standard case study research methods, 
backed, on the senior author’s part, by 35 years of experience with case studies. Our research 
draws on three kinds of sources: documents, interviews with as many as possible of the principles 
involved in the questions under study, and secondary materials. Because we drew on three 
independent types of data, as well as multiple sources within each type, we applied the principle 
of triangulation, meaning that we always sought confirmation or negation of alleged facts in other 
independent sources.  
 In other words, all alleged facts were greeted with skepticism if they could not be 
confirmed from at least one other, independent source. Given the frailty of human memory, as 
well as a more or less universal human tendency toward self-serving testimony, we were 
especially skeptical of alleged facts cited in interviews. Wherever possible, we treated interviews 
as sources of background and context, rather than sources of factual findings, and in all cases we 
sought confirmation elsewhere for any factual allegations cited in interviews. The senior 
researcher’s instruction to his co-workers was, “Get to the truth, even if it’s not interesting.” The 
careful use of these methods allows us to have a high degree of confidence in the factual 
correctness of our findings, and offers a firm basis for analysis of the findings.  
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The properties 
 The federal government properties covered in this study are in varying stages of 
development. The Barracks have only recently become surplus, and development planning has 
just begun in the past few years. The administration of the airport was honed to make it a keen 
instrument of economic development in 1997 when it came under private control; in the past few 
years, this has begun to pay off. The Forks, since its beginnings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
has been one of the most popular public spaces in Winnipeg.  
 All three properties are, or will soon be, controlled by an independent or semi-
independent agency: Kapyong Barracks by Canada Lands Company, a federal crown corporation; 
the airport by the Winnipeg Airports Authority, a community-based corporation, and The Forks 
by The Forks/North Portage Partnership, a semi-independent agency governed by a board 
consisting of appointees from all thee levels of government. Before the involvement of these 
agencies, each property was stagnant and either underused or completely unused. The Barracks 
was, and still is, simply a largely abandoned military base; the airport was little more than 
government-funded utilitarian infrastructure, and The Forks a set of railway tracks flanked by 
abandoned industrial structures.  
 These three case studies suggest the importance of involving an independent or 
semi-independent agency in the development of federal property. Left solely in the hands of 
Ottawa, the use of such property is likely to remain less than optimal. The government is simply 
too large and bureaucratic to give it the attention it requires. But once the government entrusts its 
management to an entity that can focus on the property, new possibilities for its development 
open up. 
 At the same time, the property becomes one large step removed from control by 
elected representatives. That is not necessarily the same as saying that it becomes a law unto 
itself, because, from battles over expressways in North America to public participation in public 
budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, many means other than representative democracy have been 
devised for securing responsiveness of public bodies to public demands and community needs. In 
these pages, we present the findings of case studies of each of the three federal properties, and 
consider whether their administrators have proven to be, or are on their way to becoming, 
effective instruments of economic development, as well as instruments of public policy that are 
respectful of the particular characteristics and concerns of the community they serve.   
 
Kapyong Barracks 
 When Kapyong Barracks, officially referred to as CFB Winnipeg, locked its 
gates for the last time in 2004, it joined a long procession of military base closures in both 
Canada and the United States. When such a base is located in an urban area, as Kapyong is, its 
closing often yields valuable infill real estate. Kapyong, sandwiched between two of the most 
affluent residential neighbourhoods in Winnipeg – River Heights and Tuxedo – presents a unique 
opportunity for urban development. As one City of Winnipeg planner said, “land like this only 
comes around once a generation” (Marsh, 2006), and if its potential is to be realized, its 
development requires careful thought. 
 The wheels of the federal surplus property disposal process had began turning, or 
creaking to put it more accurately, well before Kapyong’s gates were officially closed in 2004. In 
November 2001, a meeting of the Assistant Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Strategic Properties 
declared the Barracks surplus federal property (Joshi, 2006). This designation signalled the 
beginning of the long and arduous process in which the property finds itself mired even to this 
day.  
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 Federal property that is declared surplus is classified either as routine or strategic 
disposal. Either designation is intended to “ensure the best outcome for all Canadians” (Treasury 
Board of Canada Secretariat, 2001). According to Treasury Board, the federal entity responsible 
for issues of land development and management:  
 
Routine disposals are generally properties or a portfolio of properties 
with lesser value that can be sold easily without any substantial investment. 
These properties are normally sold in their “as is” state on the open market. “As 
is” transactions imply that there is limited potential for increasing the value of the 
property prior to sale or transfer and that there are no strategic interests in the 
property (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2001) 
 
On the other hand, the strategic disposal process is enacted when the surplus property in 
question possesses significant potential.  
 
Surplus real properties subject to strategic disposal are properties or 
portfolios of properties with potential for significantly enhanced value, those that 
are highly sensitive, or a combination of these factors. Because of the complexity 
associated with these properties, they may require innovative efforts and a 
comprehensive management approach to move them into the market (Treasury 
Board of Canada Secretariat, 2001) 
 
From the beginning of the process, there was little doubt Kapyong Barracks would be 
considered a strategic property. Forrmer military bases were significant generators of economic 
wealth in their previous manifestation. Considering its large size and location in the southwestern 
quadrant of the Winnipeg urban core, which is considered by developers to be the most desirable 
real estate in the city, its value is evident. Michael Colatruglio, a property assessor with the City 
of Winnipeg, estimated its current worth to be just over $15 million (Colatruglio, 2006). The 
property, therefore, was a prime candidate for transfer to the Canada Lands Company (CLC), an 
arm’s length, self-financing crown corporation. The CLC purchases surplus strategic properties at 
fair market value from the federal government, then improves, manages or sells them in order to 
achieve optimal financial and community value for both the local community and the 
Government of Canada. (Canada Lands Company, 2006a) 
 In the disposal of strategic surplus federal property, Canada Lands embarks on a 
long process that often takes years to complete. After beginning by assessing all federal and non-
federal interests, both the custodial department (in Kapyong’s case, DND) and CLC perform 
internal due diligence. Next, a third party appraises the value of the property to complement a 
business plan compiled by CLC that contributes to the determination of a final transfer price. 
After that, the custodial department develops its disposal strategy for the property. Once it 
receives approval from cabinet, it implements its disposal strategy. This involves the drafting of 
an Agreement of Purchase and Sale and CLC’s issuance of a promissory note to the Government 
of Canada. The CLC then carries out its plan, for a private sale or for planning and development 
by CLC. (Canada Lands Company, 2006a)   
 The process of takeover and development can be broken down into two phases: 
the acquisition phase, and the development phase. According to Ravi Joshi, Director of Real 
Estate in Manitoba at Canada Lands, Kapyong Barracks is in the acquisition phase at this writing, 
as it waits for DND to complete its due diligence. This process has been underway for some time 
now, having begun shortly after its designation as a strategic site. (Joshi, 2006) According to the 
CLC web site, the process consists of “completion of technical work such as title search, survey, 
and environmental studies” (Canada Lands, 2006). At the time of our research, Canada Lands 
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was hoping to own the site by fall 2006 (Joshi, 2006), but at this writing, at the end of November 
2006, the news releases on the CLC web site contained no reference to a transfer. 
 As long the process is stalled in the acquisition phase, the City of Winnipeg is, 
for the most part, uninvolved. That is not to say, however, that the city has been standing idly by. 
According to David Marsh, the City of Winnipeg Project Manager of Kapyong, the Planning, 
Property, and Development Department have been engaged in discussions with Canada Lands 
since negotiations began. Having assumed his role in January 2003, he has overseen discussions 
that have examined, among other things, what processes are required and how to accomplish 
them, as well as the type of development contemplated. He is also responsible for briefing and 
educating pertinent municipal government actors. Originally, meetings were held once a month, 
but that regularity has decreased given the current stagnation in the transfer process (Marsh, 
2006).  
 Once CLC gains ownership and the development phase begins, however, the 
city’s role will be elevated substantially. While the federal government normally has Royal 
Prerogative on federal land, meaning it can do what it wants without being subject to municipal 
by-laws, Canada Lands has the same status as a private developer. Legally, therefore, Canada 
Lands is subject to city planning authority. The city and the corporation will work collaboratively 
on the development. (Joshi, 2006). At present, the Kapyong site is zoned for agriculture  although 
this designation is dated. The Kapyong land is now surrounded by urban development. This, 








Figure 1 - Aerial view of Canadian Forces Base Winnipeg, showing adjacent 
residential districts. Source: Google Maps.  
 
 Initially, an area structure plan will be developed. This covers the layout of the 
site, including such matters as roads and underground utilities. Next, the land is subdivided and 
rezoned. Finally, interim use by-laws will have to be developed. The whole site will not be 
developed all at once. Instead of leaving large yet-to-be developed lots vacant on the property, 
these interim by-laws will allow the continued use of several of the site’s facilities, such as 
warehouses until they are ready for redevelopment. (Marsh, 2006). 
 Canada Lands is planning to develop Kapyong Barracks into a mixed-use 
residential neighbourhood designed according to principles of New Urbanism (Joshi, 2006; 
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Marsh, 2006). According to NewUrbanism.org, this design movement promotes “the creation and 
restoration of diverse, walkable, compact, vibrant, mixed-use communities… assembled in [an] 
integrated fashion… [to include amenities such as] housing, shops, entertainment, schools, parks, 
and civic facilities… all within easy walking distance of each other” (NewUrbanism.org, 2006).  
 The CLC has had previous experience with such developments, notably Garrison 
Woods, the former CFB Calgary that Canada Lands developed according to new urbanist design 
concepts. Located seven minutes from downtown, it has won numerous awards, such as Best 
Community from the Calgary Region Home Builders Association and the Honour Award for 
Planning Excellence from the Canadian Institute of Planners (Garrison Woods, 2006). The City 
of Winnipeg is fully supportive of this vision (Marsh, 2006).    
 Anyone familiar with Winnipeg city politics knows the city’s rigid zoning 
regulations hamper such innovative urban design. The current city zoning by-law, By-law 6400, 
encourages strict separation of uses and low densities – neighbourhoods that are everything that 
New Urbanism seeks to overcome. A New Urbanist development in Winnipeg, under the current 
by-law, would require the creation of its own special district. While this would not be impossible, 
as there are existing examples of this already such as the city’s French Quarter, the framework 
would still have to be created from scratch, creating more bureaucratic obstacles that would slow 
development.  
 There is good reason, however, to suppose that these obstacles are on the way to 
being overcome. Winnipeg is in the process of reviewing its zoning code. Under the proposed 
code, there is a designation called a Plan Development Overlay, which amounts to a formalized 
mechanism for custom zoning. CLC’s vision could happen under either system, but, assuming its 
passage, the new zoning by-law will facilitate the process (The Clarion Team, 2006; Marsh, 
2006). On the basis of both the city’s words and its actions it looks as if good working relations 
between the city and CLC are likely to mark the Kapyong development process. 
 In summary, though things are perhaps moving more slowly than one might 
wish, it appears that the administrative machinery necessary for appropriate development of the 
Kapyong land is either in place already, or in the process of being put in place. As a corporation 
able to operate independently of direct government control, Canada Lands Company is capable of 
operating as a developer in a private enterprise milieu; it has a strong track record for bringing the 
type of development contemplated to a successful conclusion, and it enjoys a co-operative 
relationship with Winnipeg’s planning authority.  
 We posed two questions at the beginning of the study, and we can answer the 
first of these in the affirmative: The operations of CLC and the character of its relations with 
federal and municipal governments is appropriate to the ends it is meant to serve. We can turn 
then to the second question: Are CLC and the city government appropriately responsive to 
circumstances particular to the community they intend to serve? 
 This question is more difficult to answer, because we can never be certain that 
we have all the evidence. In the absence of a very convincing process of public consultation, it is 
always possible that very real public concerns are both being ignored altogether and failing to 
come to the attention of the wider public, the authorities, and researchers.    
 The city and the CLC are making all the right noises. Several public 
consultations, we are told, will be held in the course of the development. There will also be a 
citizen advisory/focus group, as well as an “ad hoc” military committee to ensure the land’s 
history is properly honoured. While the City of Winnipeg is mandating this citizen participation, 
CLC wholeheartedly agrees with it; these consultations would be held regardless.  
 Long-time observers of Winnipeg politics may be pardoned for greeting such 
statements with skepticism. To put the point as mildly as possible, the city government does not 
have a sterling reputation for openness to public participation. The city frequently puts on a show 
of consulting the public, but rarely does it provide full information as to available alternatives, 
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offer significant opportunities for public discussion, and respond seriously to the information the 
public provides.2  
 However, we are not forced to rest our case on the thin reed of reputational 
evidence, because two issues have already arisen that provide some insights into the 
responsiveness of the CLC and the city to the public. The first has to do with the disposition of 
military housing adjacent to the Kapyong tract. Originally, the 358 housing units there were to be 
transferred to CLC along with the rest of the Kapyong land, but uncertainties arose as to just how 
many housing units the military would require in the immediate future, and how long those 
requirements would continue. As a result, the adjacent housing was temporarily severed from the 
land transfer process, and held in abeyance pending final determination of military requirements.3 
 Meanwhile, a large number of houses stood vacant. At this writing, that situation 
had persisted for three years, and 149 of the houses were being maintained and heated at taxpayer 
expense while they remained unoccupied. An advocacy organization, the River Heights 
Ministerial Housing Action Group, argued that, in preference to standing vacant, the houses 
should be made available on a temporary basis to meet some of the ever-present need for well-
maintained affordable housing. Although no one was arguing a contrary case, federal officials in 
Winnipeg were finding it difficult to obtain the authority they needed to take action on the 
request.  
 It could have been an ideal opportunity for the government that frequently bills 
itself as the one “closest to the people” to prove its mettle. A city council resolution followed by a 
mayoral appeal might have played a useful role in getting action from the Defence Department 
officials whose assent was required to make the vacant housing available. Considering that no 
one was making a case that the houses could not or should not be made available, it is difficult to 
see why a local government claiming to be committed to consultation and responsiveness could 
not manage that much.        
 The second issue concerns the possibility of Kapyong becoming an urban 
reserve. Before the Barracks were vacated, Manitoba’s Long Plain and Brokenhead First Nations 
made a claim for the land under Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE), a collection of agreements that 
give First Nations the right, and the money, to acquire surplus federal lands in those cases where 
they did not receive their proper allocation according to the numbered treaties signed between 
1870 and 1910 (O’Brien, 2003; Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2005). 
 There are conflicting accounts of what happened next. One is that, given the 
strategic nature of the site, the possibility of an urban reserve was never seriously considered, 
despite some attention in the local media. According to Marsh, TLEs are given pre-eminence in 
routine surplus property disposals. In strategic disposals however, the land is offered up to all 
federal departments, available to the highest bidder at fair market value. The acquisition process 
also becomes much more difficult. According to this account, the price of the land and the 
difficulty involved in securing it, acted as a deterrent and both First Nations abandoned the idea 
(Marsh, 2006; Perswain, 2006).     
 An alternative account suggests that the federal government was motivated, at 
least in part, by an unwillingness to have an urban reserve on Kapyong land. Chief Paul Harvey 
of Brokenhead disputes the suggestion that plans for an urban reserve were abandoned because of 
the cost of the land. Harvey claimed the federal government did not allow enough time to submit 
a proper proposal. Band authorities were only given 28 working days to prepare a business plan 
and to go through a tendering process, which Harvey considered to be wholly inadequate. He said 
the whole process, “left a bad taste in my mouth” (Harvey, 2006). In a similar vein, Chief Dennis 
Meeches of Long Plain First Nation characterized the strategic classification as a policy 
"specifically designed to keep First Nations out" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006). 
There is no way to be certain which of these conflicting accounts is closer to the truth, but 
there are some grounds for the suspicion that the federal government, anxious for a repetition of 
the CLC’s success at Garrison Woods, was less than forthcoming in facilitating a bid for urban 
 
Canadian Political Science Review, Vol 1(2) - December, 2007 pp. 1-26 
10 
reserve status. In short, though both the CLC and the city promise to be responsive to public 
demands, evidence of actual responsiveness, to either affordable housing advocates or First 
Nations, is lacking. 
 
James A. Richardson International Airport  
 “If a member of the private sector is thriving, stay out of its way.”  
 This quotation is the credo of Mayor Sam Katz, according to Alex Robinson, a 
Senior Advisor to the Winnipeg mayor, and the former Vice President of Business Development 
at the Winnipeg Airports Authority (WAA) (Robinson, 2006). Both the quotation and Robinson’s 
previous job are indicative of relations between the city and the WAA, the governing body 
responsible for the operations of the James A. Richardson International Airport. Following 
devolution of responsibility from Transport Canada, the WAA is considered a private company, 
and the city has respected that status, employing a decidedly hands-off approach. The assumption 
behind both the devolution and the city’s stance toward the WAA – that an airport is better 
managed at an arm’s length from government – has gained some support from the WAA’s 
performance.  
 In 1990, all Canadian airports were owned and operated by the federal 
government’s Transport Canada, but, in Canada as elsewhere (Advani and Borins, 2001), support 
was building for a transfer of this responsibility to a local body equipped to respond to the unique 
needs of each community and airport. The next year, the Winnipeg Area Airports Taskforce was 
assembled to examine the viability of devolution. Its report, the Winnipeg Airports Authority 
Feasibility Analysis, produced a model of local ownership to control the planning, development, 
and operations of the Winnipeg International Airport and recommended that the Taskforce enter 
negotiations with Transport Canada to lease the Winnipeg International Airport (Winnipeg Area 
Airports Taskforce, 1992).  
 The Winnipeg Airports Authority Inc. was established that same year and by 
1993, a memorandum of understanding was signed that provided the framework for negotiations 
with Transport Canada. On January 1, 1997, the transfer of authority was made official 
(Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006a), and Winnipeg became the seventh city in Canada with a 
locally managed airport. Airports in Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, and Edmonton had passed 
into local hands in 1992, and in Ottawa and Toronto in 1996 (Cash, 1996a).  
 With the signing of a 60-year ground lease agreement with Transport Canada, the 
WAA assumed the responsibility to manage, operate, maintain, and invest in the airport 
(Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006a). Although its Board of Directors comprises representatives 
from both the public and private sectors, and it is subject to detailed conditions set out in the 
Ground Lease, it is an independent, entity, substantially removed from government oversight. 
Relations between the WAA and the city are strong. According to Alex Robinson, “you 
would be hard-pressed to find any better.” Both parties benefit from a symbiotic relationship. The 
city reaps the direct benefits of the federal property’s payments in lieu of taxes, as well as taxes 
from spin-off enterprises the airport’s business creates. The WAA, in turn, benefits from its close 
proximity to downtown, Winnipeg’s geographic centrality and planning controls which ensure 
that development adjacent to the airport will not infringe upon its ability to operate 24 hours a day 
(Robinson, 2006).  
 The airports authority will rarely, if ever, exercise its royal prerogative. It will 
willingly abide by the municipal regulations of the city to keep their relations strong. Most private 
airports are bound by a Municipal Authority Agreement, spelling out the terms of their 
relationships with municipal governments. The WAA, however, is not. It has an informal, verbal 
agreement whereby it voluntarily submits itself to the standards of the city (Robinson, 2006).  
 In pursuit of its mandate to identify and adapt to local needs, and maximize the 
potential of the airport, the WAA set out to develop the airport as a 24-hour intermodal 
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transportation hub, to improve service delivery, to contribute to the development of the local 
economy and to engage the community (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 1997). However, the real 
priority was the development of the airport as a major cargo hub, a concept that had already been 
put forward and studied while the airport was still under government control.  
 Although Vancouver and Toronto were the two unrivaled strongholds of 
Canadian cargo (Bishop, 2006), proponents of the cargo hub idea aligned themselves with then-
Mayor Susan Thompson’s energetic promotion of a mid-continent trade corridor, consisting of 
highway and rail connections from Winnipeg, through Kansas City, Oklahoma City and Dallas, to 
Guadalajara, Mexico. The corridor, it was argued, would connect the fourth-most-used Canada-
US border crossing at Emerson, Manitoba, with the most-used US-Mexican crossing at Laredo. 
Because of its status as one of the few 24-hour airports in North America, Winnipeg would be an 
ideal transit point for cargo traffic between China and North America.  
 In early 1996, Winnport Logistics Ltd. a company created for this purpose, 
undertook to implement the idea. Winnport, in collaboration with partner Kelowna Flightcraft, 
acquired exclusive Canadian rights to ship cargo to and from the Chinese cities of Nanjing and 
Shenzhen. Plans called for eight trucks from Toronto, Chicago, and Minneapolis to drop off cargo 
to be shipped to China and ply the return routes. (Cash, 1998).   
 The Winnport project was a high-risk venture, and encountered numerous 
problems. Never before had Winnipeg attempted to assume such a significant economic role. 
Despite a surprisingly positive reception from freight forwarders, the airlines balked. Winnport 
had to inflate its costs by creating its own airline. It also proved difficult to generate the necessary 
traffic. While there was no problem filling the planes coming from China to Canada, it became 
clear that the North American market could not support the traffic necessary to make the return 
trips viable. (Bishop, 2006).  
 The immensity of Winnport required substantial capital investment, and initially 
it did garner strong support. Soon after its conception, it received almost $1 million from the 
province and the federal government, $1 million from private sources, and $5 million from the 
tripartite Winnipeg Development Agreement (Cash, 1996). The city also spent $8.2 million 
widening Brookside Boulevard, a major route north of the airport. These initiatives were 
undertaken in the hopes that they could serve as an economic catalyst (1996). But, despite strong 
support early on, Winnport did not have the financial wherewithal to continue. It halted 
operations on January 7, 1999, after only two months in operation, and was eventually sold to a 
Toronto company (Cash, 2002; Bishop, 2006). The failure of Winnport to acquire the capital it 
needed, and the difficulties of generating the traffic necessary for viability were compounded by 
the Asian economic downturn of the late 1990s. 
 This early experience fell well short of fulfilling the high hopes that had been 
pinned on arms-length administration of the airport, but outcomes since then have been much 
more favourable. Having learned first hand the risks entailed in such an ambitious undertaking as 
Winnport, it has shifted to a more incremental approach, involving gradual improvement of its 
facilities and vigorous marketing of the advantages it offers, including close proximity to 
downtown Winnipeg and ready access to three major North American rail lines (Canadian 
National, Canadian Pacific and Burlington Northern Santa Fe) as well as the mid-continent truck 
routes (Crockatt, 2006).  
 Accordingly, in 2003 the WAA built a new $4.2 million cargo apron. Allowing 
up to five 727 cargo jets to be loaded or unloaded at one time, it has greatly increased volumes of 
business (Bell, 2006). WAA officials claim that Winnipeg International Airport is the 12th fastest-
growing cargo airport in the world, second in North America, and the fastest growing in Canada 
(Alongi, 2006a). In 2004 cargo tonnage increased by 24.7% from the previous year. In 2003, the 
percentage increase was 12.6%, and the year before, 2.47% (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 
2006c). As of February 2006, there are 11 all-cargo carriers using the airport, including Purolator, 
DHL, Cargojet, FedEx, and UPS. (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006d, p. 10).  
 










Figure 2 - Winnipeg Airport Tenants and Neighbours 
Source: Winnipeg Airports Authority. Land development: Tenants and neighbours, 
Retrieved October 24, 2006, from: http://www.waa.ca/?pid=204. 
 
 
 The airport’s strategic location and its 24-hour operation are essential to the 
realization of these business opportunities. Company officials claim that nearly every cargo flight 
between eastern and western Canada comes through Winnipeg. For example, every UPS 
overnight flight from Montreal to Vancouver, as well as every FedEx overnight flight from 
Toronto to Edmonton, comes through Winnipeg (Crockatt, 2006, p. 2). These operations produce 
significant economic results. According to the WAA, each flight of a 727 cargo aircraft generates 
48 jobs, $2.1 million in wages, $3.0 in GDP, and $7.3 million in economic output over the course 
of a year (Alongi, 2006a). The WAA derives revenue from these cargo operations via a $541 
landing fee, a concession fee on fuel, and an $80 apron fee for each flight (Bishop, 2006).  
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 Transport Canada has recognized the growing importance of the Winnipeg 
airport by designating it as one that air carriers are allowed to use in transit between two points 
outside the country. For example a cargo aircraft on its way from the United States to Asia is 
permitted to stop over in Winnipeg, and even store goods there, regardless of whether these rights 
are granted in Canada's bilateral air transport agreements. (Transport Canada, 2004).  
 It is the development of the cargo business that is the jewel in the WAA’s crown. 
The development of land adjacent to the airport has moved forward, but at a less impressive pace. 
The WAA owns approximately 800 acres of developable land in four business parks, referred to 
as the east, south, north, and west parks. (See map below.) Only the east and south parks are 
relatively developed. The small south park contains two petroleum companies, an air charter 
operation and a Department of National Defence facility. The WAA’s development priority is the 
Airport Business Park East, where the focus has been air cargo and aerospace industries.  
 Land to the north, some of which is in the Rural Municipality of Rosser, has not 
been touched. Plans for future development include initiatives such as an inter-modal facility, e-
commerce distribution centres and foreign trade zone development (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 
2006e). For the west park, the Winnipeg Airports Land Corporation was established in January 
1999 with a mandate to undertake development in this area (Kirbyson, 1999) and the city has 
passed a secondary plan for the park (City of Winnipeg, 2002), but this is a long-term venture. 
Unlike the east and south parks, development in the north and west parks is impeded by a number 
of factors (MacLeod, 2006). Though a plan is in place, development of the infrastructure is in an 
early stage. A major investment will be required in order to service the land. Sewers, water feeder 
mains, and a major upgrade in the road system are among the missing elements. Further, one 
advantage of developing the east and south parks is their proximity to downtown, and the easy 
accessibility of major trucking routes Kenaston and Brookside boulevards. In the undeveloped 
north and less developed west, these advantages do not exist. 
 Nevertheless, the Winnipeg Airports Authority has proven highly effective in 
turning the airport into a vehicle of economic development, especially in the cargo business. As 
in the case of the Canada Lands Company, therefore, we can answer our first question in the 
affirmative: The operations of the WAA and the character of its relations with federal and 
municipal governments have shown themselves to be appropriate to the ends the corporation was 
meant to achieve.   
 In addition to economic growth, the other main pillar of the WAA’s self-imposed 
mandate upon assuming control in 1997 was a promise to become more engaged in the 
community. That sounds very much like a commitment to provide a basis for an affirmative 
answer to our second question: Is the WAA appropriately responsive to community concerns 
particular to Winnipeg?  
 The WAA’s program for public input into its decisions consists of two 
committees: the Community Consultative Committee and the Airport Advisory Committee on 
Environment. The first is an apparent vehicle for elite reconciliation and has an air of seriousness 
about it. The second seeks input from the wider community. Its organizational arrangements are 
suggestive of lack of seriousness. 
 According to the WAA’s web site (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006g), the 20-
member Community Consultative Committee includes five WAA executives and two members 
from the WAA’s design and environment committees. The other 13 members are representatives 
of community bodies that obviously have seriously substantive interests in airport affairs, 
including the Chamber of Commerce; Western Economic Diversification Canada, a federal 
government body; Destination Winnipeg, the city’s tourism and economic development agency; 
Manitoba Transportation and Government Services, a provincial department, and representatives 
of the Consumers’ Association, a local Canadian Forces Air Command base, and labour, aviation 
and aerospace interest groups. The minutes of meetings were available for down-load from the 
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web site. Two positions – the aerospace interest group and a representative of the City of 
Winnipeg – were vacant at this writing.  
 By contrast six positions were vacant on the 17-member Airport Advisory 
Committee on Environment, and the composition of the committee falls short of signalling an 
avid interest in hearing from citizens or organizations with serious concern for the environment. 
To be sure, two members of the committee, representatives of Friends of Omand’s Creek and 
Friends of Bruce Park, are concerned with the preservation and development of streams located 
near the airport, but 11 of the 17 positions were reserved for appointees of local MPs and MLAs. 
Four of these positions were vacant, as were those that were to be appointed by the City of 
Winnipeg and the Chamber of Commerce. The remaining two appointees were non-executive 
employees of the WAA, and the committee’s minutes were not available on the web site.  
 The scope of this paper does not allow for a detailed examination of the workings 
of these two committees, but on the evidence available it is reasonable to suggest that the WAA is 
less than enthusiastic about responsiveness to the concerns of the community at large. Appointees 
of MPs and MLAs – by far the majority of the environment committee – are unlikely to be the 
best choice for a critical, well-informed examination of environmental issues. The vacant 
positions suggest that the bodies and individuals empowered to make appointments do not have a 
very high opinion of the committee’s importance, while the absence of minutes from the web site 
and the fact that the WAA appointees are not executives suggests that the WAA shares that view.  
Moreover, the limitation of public input into airport operations to a committee concerned 
with environmental questions seems too fashionable by half. Although any right-thinking person 
will agree that the environment represents an important concern, there are likely to be other 
public issues arising out of airport operations, such as airport noise, impact of airport operations 
on neighbourhood businesses, or opportunities in the airport for local small businesses. On the 
available evidence, it appears that the WAA is very concerned with maintaining good lines of 
communication with the local elite – as any well-run corporation would be – but not greatly 
concerned with input from the wider public.  
 
The Forks 
 For roughly two-thirds of the 20th century, rail yards, ports, and industrial 
districts, defined by rows of tracks, littered debris, and expansive warehouses sprawled across 
vast fields of gravel and pavement, were found ubiquitously throughout the urban fabric of the 
developed world. Very often, these uses were located in the heart of a city’s downtown, because 
the city centre was not only the city’s commercial heart, but also the main point of convergence 
for water and rail transport and the hub of local industry. But, as highways replaced rail and water 
as the main means of shipping, industry moved out of the city centre and these centres of industry 
became industrial wastelands. However, in the 1960s and 70s, a growing recognition of the 
potential value of a central location helped spur a renaissance of these underused parcels of land.  
 In Winnipeg, the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers had been a 
significant venue for trading and meeting for centuries before it became the East Yards of the 
Canadian National Railways, a major centre of transportation and industry. With the expansion of 
the road system and the growth of trucking, it began to decline, and after the creation of 
Symington Yards in southeast Winnipeg, a vast sixty-five acres of land lay unused in the centre 
of the city. 
 The idea of The Forks evolved over at least two decades. As early as 1968, 
Winnipeg Tribune columnist Val Werier, possibly inspired by similar revitalization efforts of old 
industrial land across North America, began touting the site as a public space that would honour 
the city’s heritage (St. John, 2003, p. 149). In 1972, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced the 
Byways and Special Places Program to commemorate historic communication routes and adapt 
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them for recreational use. Out of this program came the Agreements for Recreation and Culture, 
or ARC Program. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Aerial view of The Forks, which extends northward from the confluence of 
the Red and Assiniboine rivers to the Provencher Bridge. (The bridge is in the centre of the aerial 
photo, and the Assiniboine River appears to be coloured green.) The bridge connects Pioneer 
Avenue with Boulevard Provencher and links the commercial heart of the city (west and North of 
The Forks) with St. Boniface, the French Quarter, east of the Red. Source: Google map. 
 
 With $14.1 million in federal funding, seventeen sites were developed along the 
Red River, including the St. Boniface Cathedral and the Selkirk Marine Museum (St. John, 2003, 
p. 150). However, The Forks would not see development until a second agreement in 1986 
allocated $3.5 million for a Parks Canada national historic site. These 5.5 hectares were nestled 
against the Red from the confluence to the Provencher Bridge. They would come to include a 
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river walkway, a multi-use open area for festivals, a boat dock and an interpretive area (St. John, 
2003, p. 151). 
 
Figure 4 - The Forks Market, a renovated East Yards warehouse. Source: Faster Light 
Communication, Box 1776, Tisdale, Saskatchewan, Canada, S0E 1T0 (306-873-2004), accessed 
at: http://ensign.ftlcomm.com/Cities/Forks/forks2004/forks2004.html, 14 November 2006.  
 
   
 That was a first step, but the crucial turning-point in the development of The 
Forks was the establishment of the Core Area Initiative (CAI). The CAI, planned for five years 
but extended in 1985 for another five, was launched in 1980 as a massive attempt to revitalize 
Winnipeg’s lagging inner city (Layne, 2000, p. 250). Lloyd Axworthy, then a young, regional 
Cabinet minister with the federal Liberals, was the driving force behind the agreement that would 
come to total $196 million in government funding by the early 1990s, with each of the three 
levels of government committing one-third of the total.  
 It was an innovative initiative, bringing three levels of government into an 
agreement as equals, a sharp contrast with previous intergovernmental relations, in which 
jurisdictions were brick walls. The program also broke down policy walls, by integrating 
economic, physical, and social elements into a single program of downtown revitalization. The 
initiative formalized an “increased understanding of the complexity, multiplicity, and inter-
relatedness of urban problems, and a corresponding acknowledgement that addressing these 
problems would require concurrent policy effort on several fronts” (Layne, 2000, p. 254).  
 In its first five years, the Core Area Initiative identified three key sites to help aid 
in physical development. These were the north Logan industrial area, the north Portage retail and 
commercial area, and the CN East Yards. While early progress was made on the first two, the 
East Yards were another matter. Axworthy did not succeed in acquiring the site from CN. The 
asking price was judged to be high, and CN demanded assistance for railway relocation (St. John, 
2003, p. 152). In fall of 1984, however, Brian Mulroney and the federal Conservatives swept to 
power, and local MP Jake Epp, a member of Mulroney’s cabinet, helped to push the project 
forward.  
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 In the end, the federal government turned over a $12 million office tower in 
downtown Vancouver to CN in exchange for 58 acres at The Forks, with CN retaining seven 
hectares along the railway tracks (St. John, 2003, p. 153). Responsibility for development was 
assigned to the CAI. Jim August, then-general manager of the CAI and now CEO of The Forks, 
said he felt CN wanted the land transfer to go through all along. It was simply a complicated deal 
whose complexities hindered the process. CN, he felt, lacked the “entrepreneurial spirit” to 
facilitate it (August, 2006).  
 In March 1986, the East Yard Task Force was appointed to review issues 
pertaining to the site, and develop concept and financial plans, as well as an implementation 
mechanism (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, 1986, p. 1). With a goal of designing a public space 
that would honour the site’s past while remaining forward-looking, the Task Force studied the 
history of The Forks, as well as the existing buildings on the land. Members visited similar 
reclamation projects in Vancouver, Detroit, Toronto, Minneapolis, and Washington.  
 The task force recommended the establishment of The Forks Renewal 
Corporation (FRC), an independent body that could make decisions at arm’s length from 
government, always with a focus on The Forks. Here, as in the case of the Kapyong Barracks and 
the Winnipeg Airports Authority, federal property of great importance to Winnipeg was entrusted 
to a corporate body not directly accountable to any level of government, and certainly not to the 
citizens of Winnipeg. 
 In 1989, The Forks National Historic Site opened just as the East Yards 
redevelopment began taking shape. Since then, The Forks has continued its evolution into 
arguably the city’s most attractive and popular public space, welcoming nearly four million 
visitors annually (Forks North Portage Partnership, 2006).    
 Today, The Forks is owned and operated by The Forks North Portage Partnership 
(FNP). The FNP came to existence in 1995, in an attempt by the Forks Renewal Corporation to 
gain more financial security. After five years of success, and in an era of increased government 
fiscal conservatism, both the federal government and the province began to withdraw monetary 
support. As a result, the FRC merged with the North Portage Development Corporation, allowing 
the former to draw upon the latter’s revenue from parking and landholdings (St. John, 2003, p. 
165). To this day, The Forks on its own loses approximately $1 million a year; financial solvency 
is only achieved through North Portage (August, 2006).  
 While the Forks North Portage Partnership is governed by a tri-level Board of 
Directors, it can act as though it were a private developer. It is managed internally; the City of 
Winnipeg has few mechanisms of control over the site’s development. Therefore, any study of 
intergovernmental relations at The Forks must be done through a lens of the FNP as an 
intermediary.    
 As explained above, the majority of the site’s land came out of the East Yard 
Task Force reports and is now owned by the FNP. However, Parks Canada still has custodial 
responsibilities for the 5.5 hectares of The Forks National Historic Site. Therefore, its relations 
with the FNP are worth considering. Barb Ford, the manager of Heritage Programs and Client 
Services at the National Historic Site, describes them as excellent, saying they are “joined at the 
hip”. They work together in two capacities. In terms of programming, they team up on a daily 
basis, collaborating in many different ways such as a joint volunteer program. Ford also sits on 
The Forks Heritage Advisory Committee. However, in terms of land use and development, she 
only described them as “good”, though she noted this grade was simply a result of less frequent 
relations (Ford, 2006).  
 August generally agreed with this assessment, but acknowledged the level of the 
Parks Canada bureaucracy can be frustrating at times (August, 2006). Any issue of political or 
public policy significance, or any matter of site development, has to be referred to the Manitoban 
national park superintendent’s office, or even, at times, regional headquarters in Calgary (Ford, 
2006). That is probably unavoidable, but Ford suggested that co-ordination between the two 
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bodies could be improved. She noted that the public often become confused between the two 
jurisdictions for tours, riverboat information, and other programming. This, she said, could be 
better harmonized (Ford, 2006).  
 The historic site’s relations with the city, on the other hand, are not nearly as 
close. They do have agreements with the city concerning matters such as the co-ordination of 
river walk cleanup, the use of the site’s docks, cross-promotion, and the use of city police for 
security during events. However, because it is federal property, its land use and development 
policies are conceived autonomously from the city. Parks management has been unafraid to 
exercise its royal prerogative, a tool many federal properties refrain from using in a sign of good 
faith to the municipality.  
 A parks manager herself acknowledged this freely. Ford (2006) described a time 
in the mid-1990s when Parks Canada was re-doing signage on the site. Initially, local managers 
applied for Winnipeg permits, but later withdrew the applications upon deciding that the process 
was too long and complicated.. 
 Despite the Forks North Portage Partnership’s relative independence, the City of 
Winnipeg does have two controls it can exercise over it. First, the city is a stakeholder, with two 
members on the FNP’s Board of Directors. These members are named and accountable to the 
mayor. The mayor, in turn, is accountable to City Council (Patterson, 2006). The Board has to 
approve The Forks Concept Plan, which sets out all plans for future development. Second, just as 
with any other developer, the city has to approve all developments. They must also meet 
Winnipeg zoning regulations (August, 2006). The city therefore has the power to intervene in the 
affairs of The Forks, and, as we will see, it has occasionally exercised that power.   
 The City of Winnipeg works with the FNP in other capacities. Often there is 
overlap in planning responsibilities that calls for dialogue and communication. For example, the 
city owns parcels of land adjacent to The Forks. The land set aside for a major new development 
now being planned, the Human Rights Museum, belongs to the city, although in the eyes of 
visitors it will appear as part of The Forks. Another example: the Esplanade Riel footbridge to St. 
Boniface is city property, but its landing on the Forks side is owned by the FNP, and completion 
of that part of the development necessitated discussions between city and FNP officials. In cases 
such as these, relations with the city are at the bureaucratic level (Patterson, 2006). 
 Relations between the Forks North Portage Partnership and the City of Winnipeg 
have never been altogether smooth (August, 2006; Patterson, 2006). When we conducted our 
interviews, August was critical of the city regarding what he perceived to be a lack of a strong 
policy framework. He argued that the city lacks vision, a criticism he directed specifically at the 
mayor, Sam Katz, and pointed to the problems this poses for The Forks management’s own 
planning (August, 2006).  
 Similarly, Jim Patterson, manager of Economic Development in the Planning, 
Property, and Development department for the City of Winnipeg, reported that communication 
between the city and The Forks had deteriorated in recent years. The old director of this 
department, since retired, used to participate in regular FNP meetings. Patterson believed her 
replacement has not continued with this. His uncertainty regarding the factual situation provides 
further evidence of the poor lines of communication (Patterson, 2006).  
 These inadequate relations may hinder the revitalization of downtown Winnipeg, 
but they underline the importance of the The Forks management’s independence from the city. 
We have seen in both the case of Kapyong and that of the airport that the independence of Canada 
Lands Company and the Winnipeg Airports Authority enhances their ability to act as agents of 
economic development. So it is with The Forks, the development of which has made it an 
unqualified success as a public space and a drawing-card for tourism.  
 A uniquely unblemished success in the middle of an often maligned and stagnant 
urban core, The Forks was host to more than four million visits and 200 events in 2005, according 
to a survey conducted on behalf of The Forks management, involving 600 interviews. The survey 
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found that 90 per cent of visitors were satisfied with the Forks, 32 per cent reported nine or more 
visits in a six-month period and almost 70 per cent said they visited, not only during Winnipeg’s 
generally salubrious summer, but also came in the often bitterly cold winter weather to enjoy 
skating, cross-country skiing and other winter activities. (Forks North Portage Partnership, 2006)  
 Despite their lackluster communication, it would appear that the Forks North 
Portage Partnership and the City of Winnipeg both support a broad notion of downtown 
revitalization. They are also on the same page regarding a number of key issues affecting The 
Forks. For example, City Council maintains it should be kept as public space, and not become a 
development site for housing. The politicians do not want private owners influencing the site’s 
policies and development (Patterson, 2006). The FNP has acceded to this view and has come to 
see The Forks as an entertainment/cultural centre, rather than an area compatible with housing.  
 Like Canada Lands Company and the Winnipeg Airports Authority, then, the 
independence of The Forks/North Portage Partnership has enhanced its ability to achieve the 
objectives for which it was created. To evaluate the agency’s record in the matter of respecting 
community difference – our second criterion of evaluation (see introduction) – we offer a brief 
summary of what happened in two instances in which proposals for new developments at The 
Forks raised community concerns, instances that are representative of a larger number of similar 
issues that have arisen over the years. 
 The first was a proposal for a German-Canadian cultural centre at the Forks, 
which was greeted with consternation by city councillors, the Aboriginal community and the 
Winnipeg public in early 1990.  The proposed centre was to cost $3.5 million dollars, $750,000 of 
which was to be paid for by the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative.  In addition, it was suggested that 
a $1 million dollar grant might be given towards the centre by the Community Places Program 
(Thampi, 1990a).   
 City councillors who were opposed to the development argued that the proposal 
seemed to favor “one ethnic group over others” (Thampi, 1990a, p. 3). In March of 1990, four out 
of six city councillors on the Civic Planning committee hoped to block the grant of $750,000 
from the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative because they felt that the Forks was an inappropriate 
location for the development (Lett, 1990).   
 Councillor Glen Murray took the position that, in light of The Forks’ long history 
as an aboriginal meeting-place, the group that should be represented at the Forks was the 
aboriginal community (Thampi, 1990a).  This sentiment was echoed by the First Nations 
Confederacy, the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (Stephenson, 1990) and a community group 
called Greening the Forks, which voiced opposition to the plan of the German-Canadian Congress 
of Manitoba to exhibit a three-tonne piece of the Berlin wall – not an artifact notable for its 
relevance to Winnipeg’s history – at the cultural centre (Lett & Thampi, 1990).   
 In April, 1990, after “a storm of protest”, the Forks Renewal Corporation, as the 
agency was then called, announced at a public forum that they were considering a new location 
for the development (Thampi, 1990c, p. 1). By June a city council committee approved a motion 
that effectively killed the proposal. (Thampi, 1990b). In this case, it is noticeable that the 
response of the Forks Renewal Corporation was sluggish at best. It took direct intervention by the 
city to stop this development proposal.  
 A decade later, another public dispute regarding a development at The Forks 
revealed the management’s slightly increased willingness to respond to public concerns, while 
illustrating how intractable the dilemma of effectiveness vs. responsiveness can be. The issue was 
the recurrent question of housing development at The Forks and the dilemma was that the 
agency’s very terms of reference virtually mandated some kind of commercial development. 
Housing at the Forks had already been a contentious issue prior to this proposal. Two other 
proposals had been suggested in previous years, including a 125-unit Eco-Village on the north 
side of Provencher Bridge and a 100-unit condominium project south of the bridge. Opponents 
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pointed to a survey that showed that the public opposed more commercial development at the 
Forks (Santin, 1998).   
 The Forks North Portage Partnership operates under a mandate to become self-
sustaining, and the agency gravitated toward housing as a relatively benign means of increasing 
its revenue as it strove to meet its mandate (Santin, 1998).  In the eyes of many citizens, however, 
the self-sufficiency mandate raised fears of commercialization and creeping privatization of a 
valued public facility (Redekop, 1999). Debate was already brewing, therefore, before a Calgary 
developer unveiled a plan to build a residential senior’s complex at the Forks. In January 2000, 
Pointe of View developers insisted that the Forks site was the only place in Winnipeg the 
company would consider building a fortress-like 117-unit complex, estimated to cost $15-million 
dollars (Connor, 2000).    
 The plan met with objections that a historic site was not an appropriate location 
for housing, especially for seniors, in an area that frequently hosted loud public events (Connor, 
2000).  Other objectors were concerned that the Forks would lose “its unique character” 
(Williams, 2000, p. 6) and that the presence of seniors might result in restrictions on public 
events. A group named The Forks For People Not Profit collected more than 500 signatures in 
April 2000 to protest the housing proposal (Williams, 2000).   
 Management of The Forks went head to head in April 2000 with the city council 
in efforts to convince them that housing at the Forks would be the beginning of a revitalization of 
the entire downtown area, but several councillors remained opposed to the housing proposal 
(O’Brien, 2000).  After a public consultation in spring of 2002, The Forks management finally 
relented and announced that housing would no longer be considered for the area (Santin, 2002). 
 The housing issue illustrates two important points. Since the Forks/North Portage 
Partnership is required to be self-supporting, its very terms of reference militate against 
responsiveness to the public where the agency’s revenues are concerned. Faced with public 
outrage, it has yielded, but it has clearly not been proactive in seeking public input. In short, as in 
the cases of the Kapyong Barracks and the Winnipeg Airports Authority, the objective of 
responsiveness to community concerns is less well served than that of effective management. 
 
Conclusion 
 We have reviewed three case studies of the multi-level governance of federal 
properties in Winnipeg. In all three cases, as we have seen, the properties are administered by 
agencies at least one step removed from direct government supervision. Considering that this 
removal from government oversight is prompted by a desire for managerial and entrepreneurial 
effectiveness, but may exact the price of reduced responsiveness to community concerns, we 
posed two research questions: 
 
• Are the operations of these agencies, and the character of their relations with federal and 
municipal governments, appropriate to the ends they are meant to serve? 
• Are they appropriately responsive to the particularities of the community they are meant 
to serve? 
 
 In one of the three cases, accountability follows traditional lines. Canada Lands 
Company is owned by the federal government and, though it enjoys considerable freedom from 
direct oversight, it remains, in the final analysis, accountable to the federal government. The other 
two cases propel us squarely into the world of multi-level governance: The Forks/North Portage 
Partnership is governed by a board equally accountable to each of the three levels of government. 
In the case of the Winnipeg Airports Authority, accountability is even more blurred. Board 
members are appointed by four governments, two of them local; two chambers of commerce; and 
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the Winnipeg economic development agency, Destination Winnipeg. Additional members are 
appointed by the board itself (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006i).  
 What then are the answers to our two questions? Our data show that the answer 
to the first question is, by and large, yes. In the case of Canada Lands Company’s prospective 
take-over of the Kapyong Barracks land, we found that the process of land transfer was proving 
to be painfully time-consuming, but on the basis of the company’s past success with a similar 
development in Calgary, there is good reason to suppose that it will ultimately produce a quality 
development. As for the Forks/North Portage Partnership and the Winnipeg Airports Authority, 
both agencies have achieved successes that would likely have been impossible under direct 
government administration.  
 Responsiveness to the particularities of the community they serve is a different 
matter. The Winnipeg Airports Authority, we found, has two committees for public input into 
WAA decisions. One of them, an apparent vehicle for the maintenance of good lines of 
communication with the local elite, appeared to be well calculated to accomplish its objective. 
The other, obviously intended to enable the WAA to remain in touch with the grassroots, gave 
every indication of being half-hearted and likely very limited in its effectiveness.  
 In the Kapyong Barracks case, the land in question is still under the ownership of 
the Department of Defence. Most of the land is  in the process of being transferred to the Canada 
Lands Company. As we have shown, two issues of community concern have arisen, but in neither 
case has there been any serious sign that responsible parties have even noticed that the concern 
exists. With the hierarchy of the Department of Defence apparently impenetrable, and Canada 
Lands Company not yet legally responsible, there would seem to be a compelling case for City of 
Winnipeg to intervene on behalf of the community, but the city, in this case, as in both other 
cases, has adopted a doggedly hands-off stance.  
 The most nearly responsive of the three agencies is the Forks/North Portage 
Partnership. Although it can hardly claim to be proactive in addressing community concerns, it 
has at least shown a willingness to pay attention whenever a community response to a pending 
decision produces a storm of adverse publicity. It is an open question whether the credit for this 
minimal degree of responsiveness goes to the agency or to the vigilance of the community.  
 Our case studies suggest, therefore, that, although governance has produced 
substantial benefits in the form of agency effectiveness, the question of how governance can be 
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